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This note derives positive implications about the e⁄ect of immigration on la-
bor income and the skill composition of the labor force in receiving economies.
The novel mechanism through which immigration a⁄ects labor-market out-
comes is the availability of new loanable funds for human-capital investment,
which results in endogenous skill upgrading. Given their higher training costs
in the host economy, immigrants usually do not acquire advanced academic
skills, and they accordingly skip the ￿nancial costs of education at the college
level. As a result, they self-select as net lenders, which reduces the equilib-
rium interest rates and facilitates the upgrading mostly of new generations of
natives. Consequently, the aggregate labor income of natives increases with
immigration.
1 Introduction
Both legal and illegal immigration from LDCs conform a reality acquiring unprece-
dented dimensions today in many developed countries. Accordingly, there has been
a substantial deal of controversy as to whether the average native worker gains or
loses from the new migratory ￿ ows. Two recent empirical exercises that obtain quite
1opposite conclusions are Borjas (2003) and Ottaviano and Peri (2006). The main
reason why the second of these papers estimates a net average gain, unlike the ￿rst
one, is the multiplicity of channels by which immigrants a⁄ect labor market outcomes.
Apart from the downward pressure on native wages, Ottaviano and Peri￿ s structural
model allows for a consideration of between-worker complementarity and the entry of
new ￿rms in response to higher pro￿tability.
Our purpose in this paper is exploring an alternative channel by which the immi-
gration surplus could be enlarged. Unskilled immigrants are often accused of draining
funds from the welfare systems of recipient countries, while they contribute very lit-
tle with direct taxes given their low upgrading prospects. Here we explore a novel
mechanism by which they could o⁄set - at least partially - that e⁄ect as net suppliers
of loanable funds. We show how immigrants - even when they are permanent - face
cultural barriers that increase their training costs; this fact makes them work dur-
ing most of their life-cycle, without a formal acquisition of academic training at the
college level. Moreover, after skipping these academic ￿nancial costs, an altruistic
motive leads them to carry their savings forward into the future in order to bequeath
to their children, which raises the amount of loanable funds available in the ￿nancial
system. This increase in loanable funds lowers interest rates, thus providing young
cohorts of natives with savings to ￿nance their educational expenses. These favorable
￿nancial conditions lower the ability requirement for those who try to become skilled,
who are mostly native, which raises the skill composition in the host economy.
In order to make our results as sharp as possible, we explore the limit case in which
the (labor-market) complementarity between skilled and unskilled labor is totally
switched o⁄. In spite of that, we ￿nd that an immigration surplus continues to exist,
even if both labor categories are perfectly substitutable. Therefore, although wages
hardly vary with immigration, the skill-upgrading of natives leads to an immigration
surplus. This result runs counter to Borjas (1994)￿ s statement that ￿ an immigration
2surplus arises only when native wages fall as a result of immigration￿ .
We want to emphasize that - given their higher training costs and the intergener-
ational persistence of that situation - certain ethnic groups of immigrants are likely
to remain stuck in their relative position of inferiority with respect to earnings and
upgrading. However, precisely because of that stickiness - and since they will proba-
bly work during most of their life cycle - they can provide natives with better wage
prospects, even in the absence of wage-premium rises due to skill complementarities.
Therefore, the frequent complaint about the relatively poor performance of some im-
migrants in the labor market may not always be justi￿ed, since the main reason for
their relative economic backwardness - i.e. their higher training costs - is also the key
to some natives￿gain from immigration.
2 Related Literature
2.1 Theoretical Contributions
There is a long history of attempts to account for the dynamics of the economic
performance of immigrants relative to natives. Along the whole series of theoretical
and empirical e⁄orts to understand the issue, there has been a common interest in the
savings rate, frequently considered the key to migrants￿capacity to accumulate wealth
and increasingly approach the economic performance of the native-born. Initially,
migrants￿apparent success to approach - and even eventually outperform - their native
counterparts was justi￿ed with self-selection arguments: the migratory decision was
only undertaken by a very speci￿c range of the foreign-born population, and therefore
the human-capital and demographic characteristics of migrants and natives were not
homogeneous.
However, in the late 80￿ s Djajic (1989) and Galor and Stark (1990) inaugurated
3a line of research by which incentives in the host country - as opposed to a self-
selection derived from the migratory decision - were highlighted as the reason for
the higher local saving-rates of immigrants relative to otherwise identical natives.
The di⁄erential incentives faced by migrants came for a certain probability of return
migration: they saved more than natives because lower future wages in the home
country increased their future marginal utility of wealth, and the extra precautionary
savings were useful for them to outperform comparable native-born.
The main novelty of our approach is that it applies even to permanent residents in
the host country who will never intend to return. That is, a higher savings propensity
does not need to hinge on a probability of return migration and an earnings di⁄eren-
tial between the home and the host country. In this sense, Cornelius (1990) reports
that the maturation of social networks of unskilled migrants in the US is making of
permanent migration a prevalent phenomenon: " the shift from a migrant population
consisting mainly of highly-mobile, seasonally employed ￿ lone males￿ , towards a more
socially heterogeneous, year-round, de facto permanent Mexican immigrant popula-
tion in California accelerated in the 1980￿ s". This tendency adds some relevance to
the potential channel we identify.
2.2 Empirical Evidence
Concerning the empirical literature, a few old pieces of evidence seemed to capture
the regularities we mentioned above about migrants￿savings propensity. For example,
Jones and Smith (1970) reported that the local (i.e. net of remittances) savings rate
of migrant workers in Great Britain in 1975 was about 2% above the UK average. For
France, the average local savings of foreign workers in 1970 was 50% higher than those
of a French person with the same income (Granier and Marciano (1975)). Further
evidence from this period is also collected in MacMillen (1982).
4Nevertheless, the previous articles provide only a weak support to our argument,
since they are based on data from countries where higher education is heavily subsi-
dized by the public sector, and therefore where our basic mechanism can hardly hold.
That is the reason why we have turned to the evidence from the US, where it is a
common practice to apply for loans to ￿nance educational expenses and repay those
loans once the applicant owns a steady job. Our major relevant ￿ndings about the
US reality can be summarized as follows:
- a) According to the 2001-2002 Current Population Survey (CPS), the workforce
participation by male undocumented migrants reaches 96%, whereas only 84% of
comparable native-born US citizens are members of the labor force.
- b) Immigrants conform 11% of total US population, 14% of all workers, 20% of
low-wage workers and 39% of low-skilled workers. These numbers seem to roughly
validate our assumption about higher training costs for migrants, and to con￿rm our
outcome about their self-selection as low-skilled workers.
- c) Is there any evidence in support of their crucial role as net lenders in the
US? Concerning this issue, we have resorted to the econometric results obtained by
Carroll, Rhee and Rhee (1999). These authors use household data from the 1980 and
1990 Census of Population and Housing in the US to test whether the saving patterns
of immigrants are signi￿cantly di⁄erent across the country of origin, and also whether
those patterns match up with the saving patterns of their home countries. They also
test whether there is a general "immigration e⁄ect" at the time of entry, taken to
mean the e⁄ect on saving that is common to all immigrants, regardless of their origin
and the duration of their stay in the US.
Interestingly, they ￿nd that "all immigrants have higher saving rates than natives",
and the "immigration e⁄ect" on the savings rate is positive and signi￿cant. But that
is not the end of the story: if their basic motivation to save so much was a possibility
5of return migration - as in Galor and Stark (1990) or Stark (2006)￿ s models - they
should have found that assimilation completely eliminates the extra savings. But,
however, for many countries the estimates show no sign of assimilation in savings
behavior. Even for those countries which have those signs of assimilation, "it takes
27 to 62 years to close a 5 percent saving rate gap".
Moreover, Carroll, Rhee and Rhee (1999) also report that "immigrants from
Greece, Italy and Portugal had the highest savings rate, over twenty percent of in-
come annually." And, precisely, it is noticeable that people from those countries in
the sample are mostly blue-collar workers (producers and labor workers) often with
only elementary educational attainment (47.5% for Greece, 67% for Italy and 74.6%
for Portugal, respectively). We believe that there must be an underlying economic
rationale behind the saving behavior of those ethnic groups and its impact on the
host economy, and we have tried to shed some light on these issues.
3 The Model
3.1 Assumptions and general description
Immigrants are assumed to stay permanently in the host economy. They enter the
host country (at the beginning of their life) without previously-accumulated human
capital, and - for simplicity - the higher training costs are intergenerationally perma-
nent, in such a way that there is no di⁄erence between newly-arrived immigrants and
their children with respect to upgrading probabilities.1
We portray a receiving country whose production function combines skilled (Ns)
1Alternatively, we could make every generation of immigrants become identical to natives in
their second period of life, but allow for a continuous ￿ ow of immigrants in every period. Under this
alternative setup, we would not expect results to change substantially.
6and unskilled industrial workers (Nu) in a perfectly-competitive environment. For
simplicity, we have abstracted from the use of physical capital. Individuals supply
a unit of labor inelastically and there is no disutility from e⁄ort. The production








where ￿ > 1 is an indicator of technology bias towards skilled labor. Traditional
models of immigration surplus have focused on labor-market complementarities de-
rived from a limited degree of substitutability between skilled and unskilled labor
(0 < " < 1); this resulted in a net gain for the native population once unskilled wages
fell and the subsequent surplus was appropriated by skilled labor (or capital). In
contrast to these explanations - and in order to sharpen our point - here we will focus
on a pure capital-market complementarity in which both types of labor are perfect
substitutes and - consequently - their respective wages are not altered by immigration
(since " = 1). We will show how, even in that case, skill-upgrading is able to induce
a rise in the aggregate labor income of natives.
As a result of perfect competition - and given (1) and our assumption on perfect





In our model, which is based on Galor and Zeira (1993), individuals live for two
periods. In the ￿rst one they must decide whether to acquire skills by investing in
academic training - using the parental human-capital bequest - or to work as unskilled;
in the second period they work according to their skills, consume, have a child, decide
upon the child￿ s home education and (potentially) leave a human-capital bequest.
Our particular assumption is that parents do not bequeath physical or ￿nancial
capital in period two, but they can hire some quali￿ed professors to teach their child
at home and reduce his/her future training costs (at the university) in case he/she
7was to become skilled.2 More speci￿cally, if the child is capable enough, parents
￿nance x hours of home teaching. Such a human-capital transfer will reduce their
child￿ s needed number of hours in college by the amount ax, where a is a measure of
the idiosyncratic ability of the child to pro￿t from home-education.
We adopt the assumption of risk-neutrality of preferences and warm-glow altruism,
in the form of parental interest in the future income enjoyed by the child. The assump-
tion on risk neutrality is a strong one, because in that way the optimal human-capital
bequest (x) is independent of parental wealth. Nevertheless, we are not interested
in the dynamics of income inequality, but in a simple comparative-statics exercise
between two steady states with a di⁄erent proportion of migrants in the population
of the host country. Under risk neutrality, there will be a unique steady state, which
will facilitate our work. Let us consider the following utility function, expressed in
expected terms:
Ut = ct + ￿EtWt+1 (3)
where ct stands for consumption (during adulthood) and EtWt+1 for the expected
income accruing to the next generation. On the other hand, ￿ is an indicator of
parental altruism towards future generations.
During his/her educational process, any individual must hire a quantity ￿ of skilled
professors at the university, though his own ability combined with the human capital
bequest allows him to reduce that upgrading cost. Every professor works for one pe-
riod. When deciding whether to upgrade skills in period one or not, young individuals
make the following comparison:
(2 + r) ? ￿(1 ￿ (￿ ￿ ax)(1 + r)) (4)
2Altruism and bequests are not strictly necessary to make our point. Nevertheless, they are
convenient to justify immigrants￿decision not only to work from the beginning, but also to postpone
consumption and save. An alternative would be introducing a reason to save endogenously during
the ￿rst period of life, by means - for example - of a cost of rearing children during the second period.
8where ￿￿ is a measure of the training costs, which depend on the skilled wage - as in
Rigolini (2004) - because only skilled teachers can train the unskilled labor force.The
term ax represents the amount of training that the individual can skip due to the
familial transmission of human capital (x) and his/her idiosyncratic ability (a).
Unskilled individuals are supposed to work in both periods and save the initial
earnings for the second one, since they only consume (and bequeath) in period two.
The skilled ones borrow from the unskilled to pay for their training costs in the ￿rst
period, and then repay their debt once they receive the skilled wage in the second








(2 + r) ￿ ￿
￿ (1 + r)
￿￿
￿ ￿ a (5)
whereas a similar expression ￿ a0 holds for immigrants provided that we replace ￿ by
￿0 ￿ ￿:
Our assumption is that parents observe the realization of the child￿ s ability and
decide upon leaving a human-capital bequest (or not) on the basis of that realization.
From (5), they know that the child will upgrade i⁄ x ￿
￿
a, where
￿(r) = ￿ +
￿
(2 + r) ￿ ￿
￿ (1 + r)
￿
(6)
and a is the observed realization of the ability random variable. Therefore, following
(3), parents will compare the current costs and future bene￿ts of providing a bequest,




+ ￿ (￿ ￿ (2 + r)) ? 0
For simplicity, we have assumed that parents derive utility from their child￿ s gross
earnings, before their debts have been repaid. This implies that parents will bequeath
exactly what their child needs to become a skilled worker, and never more. If the
9previous inequality is non-negative, it will be worth for them to leave a bequest due
the high gross earnings of the o⁄spring. This will happen only if the ability realization
is high enough, i.e. there will be a bequest provided that
a ￿ ￿ ￿
2 + r ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿(1 + r))
￿ (￿ ￿ (2 + r))(1 + r)
(7)
Therefore, it is the boundary-value for the parent (￿) the only relevant cuto⁄ for the
decision-making. It is easy to check that @￿
@r> 0. Let us denote by ￿0 the relevant
cuto⁄ value for immigrants, who only di⁄er from natives because ￿0>￿: We also
assume that a is a random variable that follows a general distribution function F(a),
with support on a 2 [0;1); such that F 0(a) ￿ 0 8a.
The labor force in the model can be native or immigrant. We assume that the
amount of native population is normalized to 1, whereas a measure M of immigrants
are already in the economy during the ￿rst period considered. The only distinction
between any native and immigrant employee is the cost parameter ￿0> ￿, which is
higher for immigrants because of the need to learn the language and similar cultural
barriers.
Where do teachers come from in this economy? Since they are skilled employees,
they must get the same wage as the skilled industrial workers, i.e. all members of the
skilled labor force must be indi⁄erent between teaching or working for the industry.
Furthermore, there must be exactly the right amount of teachers to train next period￿ s
labor force. Therefore, if we denote the measure of teachers at time t by ￿t and the
measure of skilled industrial workers at time t by Ns




s = (1 ￿ ￿)(N
s + ￿)
103.2 Existence and uniqueness of a steady-state competitive
equilibrium
If we now consider an endogenous interest rate r, we can obtain the conditions
required for the existence and uniqueness of a steady-state competitive equilibrium
in this economy. This equilibrium can be de￿ned as a positive interest rate and
a subsequent allocation of immigrants and natives across the skilled and unskilled
occupations, such that the supply of credit by the unskilled is identical to the demand
by skilled industrial workers and teachers. It is straightforward to derive that the
relevant equilibrium condition in steady state is
F(￿) + MF(￿




where on the left-hand side we have the supply of loanable funds by the unskilled,
and on the right-hand side we can observe the aggregate expenditure on training.
Taking expressions (6) and (8) into account, the previous expression boils down to
the following equality:
￿ ￿ (2 + r)
1 + r
(1 ￿ F(￿) + M(1 ￿ F(￿
0)) = F(￿) + MF(￿
0) (9)
Studying carefully the previous equality gives rise to the following proposition on the
conditions for the existence and uniqueness of a steady-state competitive equilibrium.
Proposition 1 If ￿(1 ￿ ￿0) ￿ 2; then there exists a unique steady-state competitive
equilibrium characterized by a positive interest rate r￿ 2 (0;￿ ￿ 2); with positive mea-
sures of the native and immigrant population both in the borrowing and the lending
side of the credit market.
Proof. From expression (9) it is straightforward, after rearranging, to come up with




[(￿ ￿ (2 + r))(1 + M) ￿ (￿ ￿ 1)(F(￿) + MF(￿
0)))] (10)
11where we have denoted by Z(r) the di⁄erence between the aggregate demand and the
aggregate supply of credit. From (7) we can observe that the value of r that makes




￿ ￿ 2 ￿ ￿￿0
1 + ￿￿0 (11)
i.e. r
ﬂ
is the value of the interest rate that shuts down the supply of credit. On the
other hand, the value of r that shuts down the demand for credit is precisely
￿ r = ￿ ￿ 2 (12)
Now we have to prove that our equilibrium interest rate lies between both values




1+￿￿0 > 0 and also Z(￿ r) =
￿(￿ ￿ 1)(1 + M) < 0: Moreover, a thorough inspection reveals that Z(r) is a con-
tinuous, di⁄erentiable, strictly decreasing function for all values of r. This implies,
using Bolzano￿ s theorem, that - if r
ﬂ
￿ 0; i.e. if ￿(1 ￿ ￿0) ￿ 2 - then there exists
a unique competitive equilibrium interest rate r￿ 2 (0;￿ ￿ 2) such that Z(r￿) = 0:
Furthermore, ￿(r￿) > ￿0(r￿) > 0; which involves that there are positive measures of
the native and immigrant population on both sides of the credit market.
The previous proposition spells out the requirement of a relatively advantageous
skilled occupation (in terms of both the skill premium and training costs) for the
existence of an active demand side of the credit market. At the same time, that
condition guarantees that the supply side will be active as well, since market clearing
ensures that one side of the market will not shut down while the other is active.
Furthermore, the equilibrium interest rate is shown to be unique, which facilitates
our task of predicting the e⁄ects of immigration.
3.3 The availability of loanable funds
Now we are ready to derive our desired e⁄ect of immigration on the availability of
loanable funds. This happens because, in this setting, loans are supplied by unskilled
12workers who receive income from their ￿rst period of life - though they can not
consume until the second period - and they are demanded by the skilled labor force
to ￿nance their individual training expenses. Migration provides a higher proportion
of unskilled people who supply funds, which reduces r and also the cuto⁄ values of ￿
and ￿0 needed to access high-wage jobs. For the new supply of immigrants to provide
a net supply of funds, they need to face higher training costs in order to enlarge the
pool of lenders more than the pool of borrowers. As a result, it is possible to obtain
an immigration surplus that does not depend on variations in the wage premium.
Proposition 2 Provided that " is close enough to 1 (perfect substitutability between
unskilled and skilled labor) and ￿0 > ￿, then d￿
dM < 0; d￿0
dM < 0; dr
dM < 0 and the
aggregate labor income of natives increases with immigration.3
Proof. From (9) we can di⁄erentiate and solve for dr




(￿ ￿ (2 + r)) ￿ (￿ ￿ 1)F(￿0)
￿
MF 0(￿0)d￿0
dr + F 0(￿)d￿
dr + (1 + M)
￿ (13)
Furthermore, we know from (9) that ￿ ￿ (2 + r) =
(￿￿1)(F(￿0)M+F(￿))
1+M : By plugging the








dr + F 0(￿)d￿
dr + (1 + M)
￿ (14)
We know from (7) that d￿
dr; d￿0
dr > 0 and hence the denominator of the last expression
is positive. For (14) to be negative we also need the numerator to be smaller than







dM < 0: Since wages are invariant - by perfect substitutability - and
￿ > (2 + r) > 1; the aggregate labor income of natives increases.
3By aggregate labor income of natives we understand the sum of the remunerations to both skilled
and unskilled labor.
13Additionally, we can make some inferences about the welfare implications of im-
migration for di⁄erent goups of natives. All generations of natives can be ex-ante
better-o⁄ if the skill premium is high enough. Indeed, we know that
￿EtWt+1 = ￿ [(1 ￿ F(￿))￿ + (2 + r)F(￿)] = ￿ [￿ ￿ F(￿)(￿ ￿ (2 + r))]
Since immigration reduces the interest rate, there are 2 opposite e⁄ects of immigration
on the expected income of the o⁄spring: on the one hand, it is easier for them to
upgrade and get the higher wage, but if they do not, they will receive lower interest-










0(￿)(shareu) > 1 (15)
where shareu =
F(￿0)M+F(￿)
1+M is the share of unskilled population over the total. Ex-
pression (15) means that the expected income of the o⁄spring will rise if (and only
if) the ability cuto⁄ is substantially lowered, many people take advantage of it and
the skill premium is substantial enough.
4 Conclusions
This note establishes a formal link between the relative training costs of migrants and
their working and saving behavior, with an immediate implication with respect to the
skills of natives￿future generations. One of the innovative aspects of this work is the
absence of any reference to return migration as a key to understanding the saving
behavior of immigrants. Another one is the way we disregard any complementarity
between productive factors, in order to di⁄erentiate our argument from traditional
models of immigration surplus.
As a conclusion, we can emphasize that the reason for the usual complaint about
the relatively poor performance of immigrants in the labor market may work as a
14blessing under the right circumstances, since the cause of their (relative) economic
backwardness - i.e. their higher training costs - is also the key to some natives￿gain
from immigration. Another intriguing implication is the fact that, even in the case
of perfect substitutability between skilled and unskilled labor, natives can always be
better-o⁄ in real terms provided that the skill premium is high enough.
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